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Both in content and in form Tronsce!}den.tal Wordplay aims for, but never quite achieves, a 
refreshing mixture of traditionalism and innovation. Jn the book's preface, West professes 
his 'mistrust' for most cmTent academic writing, which he views as both jargon-ridden and 
unnecessarily hostile, and calls upon American literary critics to return to basics. Fittingly, 
considering the book's subject, West aspires to write in a playful, informal, densely allu-
sive style, which he believes will appeal to 'ordinary readers' who also ' reco il from most 
academic literary criticism' (xvi). By interspersing his formal pontifications (West's pun, 
not mine) with myriad informal jokes, asides, witticisms and anecdule~, Transcendental 
Wordplay ambitiously undertakes to resist academic dullness, and to revive as well as 
explain the ebullient transcendental style. It is easy to sympathize with this endeavor, but 
it does not take one of West's pathologically suspicious ideology critics to see that his 
stylistic project undermines itself, if only because West's prose shares at least one telltale 
characteristic of the modern academic discourse that he disdains so much: excessive pro-
lixity. Weighing in at more than 500 pages, Transcendental Wmdplay is an extremely and 
in several ways unnecessarily long book. Moreover, the book's opaque structure, with its 
14 mutually overlapping chapters, makes the underlying argument hard to discern and 
follow. West may well claim transcendental precedence for his freewheeling resistance to 
formal economy - think of Whitman's Leaves of Grass or Melville's Moby-Dick- but at 
some points in his discussion he might have benefited more from modeling himself on 
other textual precursors, like Poe 's brief tales or Dickinson's compact lyrics. Thoreau, as 
West notes, not only punned but also tried to contain punning's tendency to overwhelm 
other discursive modes, and perhaps West should have followed his hero on this point, too. 
At its best, in any event, transcendental wit was never the same as sheer loquacity or undue 
long-windedness, and one cannot help thinking that West sometimes treads perilously 
close to the latter. 
Peter Mortensen University of Aarhus 
Mark Turner, Cognitive Dimensions of Social Science. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 224 pages; ISBN: 0-1951-3904-6; $25 cloth. 
Let us start by carving out two basic premises: Firstly, no matter what methodology or tra-
dition the social scientist subscribes to, one thing remains an unquestionable, fundamental 
condition of her endeavour: she cannot ever escape her own cognitive constitution. Sec-
ondly, almost all that can be called the social scientist's object, that is, almost everything 
that somehow constitutes human society or culture is, unavoidably, mediated through 
human cognition. 
And so what? These may just seem to be pretty banal and somewhat fut ile observations. 
But not so. It may be that most social scientists would subscribe to them, but, and this is 
the point, they do not seem to take them as seriously as they should. And, in this respect, 
the cognitive scientist Mark Turner argues, 'social science as a whole is in a position 
something like biology before the theory of evolution': 
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Biologists, or rather botanists and zoo)pgists, studied flora and fauna in exhaustive 
detail, in niches, in situ, penetrating the mysteries of their local habitations, measurin 
them, counting them, tracking cycles, writing all this down in the equivalent of fiel~ 
guides, and deve loping the abi lity to predict many natural phenomena, including phe-
nomena of change - if frost fa lls, the bud is harmed ; if the soil is enriched, growth 
improves, and so on ... But these interpretations did not explain and were not meant to 
explain the biological processes according to wh ich these species could exist in the first 
place, or descend, or develop, or di ffer. To expla in these more basic issues required the 
theory of evolution, which, once it was available, became an indispensable instrument 
in the professional study of local, nan-owly coordinated, in situ life forms and the niches 
they inhabit.4 
Human meaning is, of course, essential to social science, but neverthe less it tends to be 
taken as something given. And from the point of view of cogniti ve science, whose task is 
to face and try to tackle this very difficult pheno menon, such a (lack of) treatment of 
human meaning is unsettling. Turner continues: 
Taking human meaning as given and interpreting it, according lo one or another social scien-
tific practice, without referring to the neurocognitive level at which these meanings emerge, 
is like taking the ex istence of life forms as given and interpreti ng them without referri ng to 
the theory of evolution ( 14). 
Or even more bluntly, social scientists have at the heart of their endeavour a phenomenon 
which they only have a superfic ial conception of. However, the cogniti vists do not pass 
judgment on the social scientists for that. They sympathize deeply: 
Social science does nothing wrong here, since cognitive science has no theory of emergence 
and descent of meaning that can begin to compare with the theory of evolution of species. We 
really are in the position of botanists and zoologists before the theory of evolution, and it is 
indeed something like the theory of evolution that cognitive science is trying, by gists and 
piths, wi th set-backs, to discover (14). 
But if the cognitivists themselves have not yet succeeded in grasping complete ly what con-
stitutes human meaning and hnw it works anyway, and if socia l science has managed to be 
a flourishing sc ience hitherto without having to rely on the cognilivists to tell them what 
human meaning is, then why bother now? That is bas ically the question that Mark Turner 
attempts to answer in Cognitive Dimensions of Social Science. 
A New Path 
Firstly, that social sc ience has been a flourishing sc ience without cognitivist interference 
does not mean that it could not get better. Secondly, social scientists themsel ves seem 
to acknowledge the need for a reconsideration of their craft. At the turn of the millen-
4. Mark Turner, Cognitive Di mensions or Social Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 200 1 ), 13. 
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nium social science, like so many o1!ier fie lds is tormented by ideological and method-
ological schisms and is on the lookout for new strategies and profiles - a new unified 
identity. 
ln 'A New Context for a New American Studies?' (1989), Robert F. Berkhofer explores 
the nature of particular central notions, the notions of text and context, that have shaped 
and split American Studies since the war. The problem, according to Berkhofer, is that 
American Stud ies is Lorn between two extreme poles: a traditional ist, 'contextual funda-
mentalism' and an equally fundamentali st 'textualism,' which is informed by the inter-
disciplinary influence referred to as ' the linguistic turn.' The image that Berkhofer 
evokes is one of a conceptual highway. The logic of thi s metaphor is simple: Since 
you cannot drive on both sides, since the choice of one side - in competi tion - excludes 
the other, and since both sides have their manifest weaknesses, American Studies is left 
in a methodological and political di spute and a painful methodenschmerz. But how may 
this be resolved? How can a fruitful middle way be found? And what should it look 
like? 
Berkhofer presents the different sides of the conceptual highway in the following way. 
Contextual fundamenta lism is constituted by a range of traditional creeds: 
At the heart of contextual fundamentalism is the premise that documents, artifacts, or 
texts arc basically self- interpreting without recourse to any explic it framework. As prac-
tise, such an approach acts as if the text's words or the artifact's existence were deter-
minative, that is conceptually coercive, of the 'reading' they arc to receive - regardless 
of the reader's values, politics, interpretive paradigm, or interpretive community. Thus 
'facts' are discovered, not created or constituted by the frameworks that enable their 
existence. 5 
Hence, according to contextual fundamentalism, the ultimate context is history itself, and 
the text is simply a fragment of that historica l contex t. Consequently, out of contextual 
fundamentalism springs the ideal of the 'Great Story, ' the overall story comprising all indi-
vidual stori es, which have somehow been fitted together and reconciled into one viewpoint 
and one voice. 
Textualism is the radical opposition: denaturalization, demystification, deconstruction, 
dehierarchicalization, and derefentia lization. The coherence, unity, and detenn ination that 
contextual fundamentalism presupposes for historical reality are heavily challenged or 
completely exterminated by the attitudes which favour a textualist approach. The notion 
of a manifold but shared human biology is replaced by the notion of class division - an 
enactment of the ancient nature/culture dichotomy. The notion of a shared underlying 
5. Robe11 F. Berkhofor, 'A New Context for a New American Studies?,' American Quarterly, 41 , 4 ( 1989), 
589. 
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American myth, which it is the job of_,.~cholars to reveal, is turned into the notion of a 
divided society. Ideas are no longer something that are governed and directed by a 
common basis, but something over which political battles are fought. Signified and sig-
nifier are torn apart. The meaning of a text is no longer determinative. In fact, language 
is subversive of its own meaning. No one or nothing holds cultural authority, and hence 
there is no privileged essence, no elite, no universals, no privileged aesthetics, no autho-
rial meaning, and no primary foundation. It is all a matter of ideological and political 
struggle. 
These opposing sides are incompatible, and each has proven inadequate or futi le in its own 
way. Yet, thjs situation could also be framed differently: that each a lso seems to have -
albeit in too radical a measure - something that the other one needs, something that would 
strengthen the other one. Hence, what Berkhofer presents as a new alternative is not just a 
rejection of both, but a middle way, which on the one hand avoids the 'conceptual rela-
tivism, intellecLUal if not social anarchy, and ph ilosophical and politica l ni hilism'(595) 
which the linguistic turn ulti mately leads lo, while on the other hand also avoiding the 
' naivete of the old historicism' (591): 
Sure ly the effort must advance beyond the recent t1ood of new but normal histories of 
methodologies, disciplines, and mediate between - if not proceed beyond - textua l ism 
and contextualism as versions of context, between poetics and politics as textual ver-
sions of social reality. Tl cannot accept and base its narrative upon a trnnsparent social 
history as normally written for grounding its own analysis of the social production and 
consumption of texts through demystification. lt cannot rchicrarchicalizc or re-essen-
tialize some basic social and cultural categories as it poeticizes the contextualization of 
other concepts and categories . It cannot move the marginal peoples to the center of the 
story in the guise of the othe r but still resort to the traditional paradigm of the past as tl1e 
Great Story. Lastly, it ought not pretend to a middle way, if it narrows the road to 
achieve that path (603). 
Interestingly, it seems to be exactly on the same position, on the middle of the concep-
tual highway of approaches to human meaning, that cognitive science has also found 
a new path, a path that appears to lead, better than any previous paths, to the heart of 
the mysteries of human meaning. Cognitive science itself also has a history of great 
schisms, which arc alike in nature to the ones that Berkhofer finds in American Studies. 
Often cognitivists frame these schisms as the opposition between subjecti vism and 
objccti vis m. 
Subjecti vism ultimately leads to the same kind of cultural nihilism, anarchy, indeter-
minism, and cognitive solipsism that the linguistic turn has tormented social science with . 
Objcctivism, on the other hand, tends to ignore everything that is human in human 
meaning. According to the objcctivist creeds, human beings merely acqu ire, carry, and use 
meaning, e ither correctly or wrongly. They do not create or shape meaning themselves. 
Meaning transcends human be ings. 
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In !he last two-to-three decades, ho'j:ever, a new cognitive paradigm has emerged and 
developed into a powerful and influential branch of human science. Some call them 'West 
Coast Cognitivists' (as opposed to the predominantly formal and objectivist 'East Coat 
Cognitivists' - we are, of course, talking about the Easl and West coasts of the United 
States); others, including themselves, refer to !his new 'school' as 'Second Generation 
Cognitive Science' (henceforth SOCS). Many identify SOCS with works such as George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson's Metaphors We Live By ( 1980), Mark Johnson's The Body in 
the Mind (1987), and Lakoff's Women, Fire, and Dangerous Thi11gs (1987). Tu lliest: hall-
marks of the new cognitive science, the authors depart from the opposing sides of the con-
ceptual highway of cognitive sc ience and lay down the contours of a new path: 'experien-
tial ism.' Experientialism is a kind of middle way, but it is also much more. To use 
Berkhofer's phrase, it 'proceeds beyond' both subjectivism and objectivism. Today the 
exploration of the potential of experiential ism has expanded and improved the new cogni-
tive paradigm extensively, and new research spearheaded by people like Mark Turner and 
his partner for almost a decade, Gilles Fauconnier, has turned SOCS into a massive 
research program. 
Cognitive Dimensions of Social Science is an icon of present-day SOCS , with special 
focus on Turner and Fauconnier's groundbreaking theory of 'conceptual integration,' also 
called 'blending,' which we will return to below. As the title indicates, the book is, in fact, 
nothing less than an invitation from the author to consider the potential of a future engage-
ment, or even wedding, between cognitive science and social science. 
Interestingly, Berkhofer 's concerns overlap considerably, if not completely, with questions 
raised al a conference at the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, 
Princeton in May I 997, which was attended by Mark Turner, who spent a year at !he Insti-
tute in 1996-97: ' Where exactly do we stand, and where do we go from here? What kind of 
problems should we be addressing, with what kinds of approaches and arguments?' 
Turner's answer, 'in a nutshell,' to this 'bracing swash of impossibly broad questions' ' is 
that social science is headed for an alliance with cognitive science' (4). Hence, in spirit at 
least, Turner suggests exactly what Berkhofer is on the lookout for: a new context for 
social science. And this context is, in broad terms, the basic premises that were written out 
at the outset of this review. It is, though Turner himself is more modest i.n his choice of 
words, a proposal for a restaging of social sc ience methodologies and ideologies in l1 
framework of cognitive science. Or to put it in a fashion that highlights the essence of 
Turner's endeavour, a restaging of a science that deals with the products of human cogni-
tion in a science that dea ls with the workings of human cognition. 
This may sound like a clear case of interdisciplinary imperialism: one discipline attempts 
to swallow another by subordinating its scope and method in a larger framework. That, 
however, is by no means the case. At the very core of the cognitive science community are 
people with backgrounds in different disciplines in the Humanities. And the results 
achieved in cognitive science to a great degree depend upon this fact: that hypotheses and 
theories have been built on evidence collected in different areas of research, what Ronald 
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Langacker refers to as 'converging evidenc,e.' 6 Tims, Turner's embedding should be seen 
as a symbiotic embedding rather than an imperialistic embedding. Viewed against the 
background or the by now traditional divisions that exist in the field of the Humanities, 
cogni tive science is by nature trans-discipl inary. And the simple reason is that evidence of 
human cognition is found in all fields of the Humanities. 
Furthermore, since the research done by cognitive scientists shows that dimensions such as 
physiology, neurobiology, and genetics play a centrnl role in human cognition, cognitive 
science even presents a natural link between the Humanities and the natural sciences. As 
opposed to Descartes' dualism, SGCS holds that body and brain are crucial to under-
standing how the mind works. There are no pure ideas in a sphere of pure mind, and this is 
what makes SGCS anti-objectiv ist. On the other hand, the fact that we do share the same 
biological codes and the fact that we are a social species and not an individualistic species, 
gives us a shared basis for meaning-making which underl ies cultural differences. One 
could say that despite the fact that there are huge cultural differences between nations and 
even inside nations, it will always potentially be possib le for us to understand each other 
because a shill'ed basis is what constitutes us as human beings, and this is what makes 
SGCS anti -subjectivist. To return to Turner 's evolution-metaphor fo r understanding 
human meaning: simply observing forms may lead to cLisastrous fallacies since the 
apparent discreteness of these fo rms belies the universality and communality of their 
maker: human cognition. 
In other words, the nature of the approach that Berkhofer is trying to provide for American 
Studies seems to be very much the nature of the approach that has emerged in SGCS. And 
the reason why the social scientists should care is that apparently they have become 
exhausted from staring at the forms only. The new context that Turner proposes is not one 
that abandons any particular previous social science methodology, but one that aims al 
taking social science behind its forms to view its research and methodologies in a new 
light, and then eventually either/both reconsider old methodologies and research results 
or/and contribute to developing the cognitive theories. Both disciplines are venturing out 
on new paths. These paths are alike, and each discipline has something the other one 
craves: social science has expert insight into an important area of human cognition, and 
cognitive science has the tools to give social science a push forward. 
The Descent of Meaning 
Turner and Fauconnier's particular candidate for a theory of the way human beings create 
new meaning and hence Turner's candidate for understanding the complex social products 
that human beings have always been able to develop is, as mentioned above, conceptual 
integration. And in his book, he uses the insights from this theory to consider a range of 
traditional social science methods and qualitative analyses . 
6. Ronald Langacker, 'Assessing the Cognitive Linguistic Enterprise. In Rene Dirven, Ronald Langacker, 
and John R. Taylor (eds), Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology. Cognitive LingL1istics 
Research, 15 (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), 26. 
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The firs t chapte r of the book is a sa lu!i1tionary duel with the renowned social scientist Clif-
ford Gecrtz. Turner takes up Gecrtz' brilliant analysis of the Balinese Cockfight in 'Deep 
Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight' ( 1973) and offers an alternati ve blending-analysis. 
ln very broad terms, what the theory of blending proposes is that the most dist inctive, 
basic, and impo1tant cognitive skill !hat human beings have is the abi li ty to combine and 
fuse two, or more, different domains of knowledge or experience - two, or more, mental 
structures - whereby a new, unique domain of knowledge - a new mental structure -
emerges. This new mental structure is not just lht: sum of the contributing mental struc-
tures. Tt has an emergent structure of its own, which is the result of 'fitting' selecti vely the 
contributing structures. And the Balinese Cockfight as a social phenomenon, Turner 
argues, is the result of such an integration of mental structures. 
The Balinese have experience with their social strnctures and with cocks, and these 
domains of experience serve as contributing ' inputs' to the blend that constitutes the Bali-
nese cockfight. ln this very complex blend, an extremely refined ritual emerges where 
roles and characteristics from the contributing inputs are blended lo create new roles and 
relations. The cock, for instance, as a fighter, receives a kind of human status, which is the 
result of blending the Balinese cock-owner 's potentia l human intentionality of fighting for 
a higher social ranking with the cock's instinc tual behaviour. That is, in the ritual, in the 
blend, the Balinese man can behave like a beast. 
But rituals like cockfights are just one very obvious example of blending. Blending is at 
work everywhere, Turner argues, and it constantly directs our thoughts in ways that arc so 
subtle that we would never notice them without careful analysis. And this might be the 
very reason why so many otherwise very refined methodologies have fa iled to meet the 
ultimate scientific criteria. The human mind is so fast and so comprehensive that no scien-
tist can ever hope to exert control over it while practicing her sc ience. And in the phe-
nomena she studies, there will consequently also be much more than meets they eye. 
Hence, what she has to do is try to understand the mechanisms that control her and the phe-
nomena she studies. 
Other examples that Turner gives are for instance counte1factual reasoning (if X, then Y), 
human choice making, and thinking in terms of analogy. Again, what underlies these 
examples, it is he ld, is that particular, universal, 'faste r than its own shadow' mechanism, 
blending. A counterfactual assertion like 'If C hurchill had been prime minister in 1938 
instead of Nevi lle Chamberlain, Hit ler would have been deposed and World War II would 
have been averted' is a blend composed, among more things, from what is known about 
Churchill as an outspoken opponent of Germany in 1938 and the historical situation of 
Chamberlain facing the threat from Germany in 1938. This kind of thinking is quite ordi-
nary in our everyday lives, and it underlies much scientific thinking too. But despite the 
fact that careful methods for using counterfactual thinking in science have been worked 
out, it remains problematic. Counterfactual thinking may be useful for many purposes 
since such hypothetical or fictional situations can be used to throw light on actual situa-
tions, but it is an illusion to think that it can be used for completely controlled lab-like 
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experiments. Most ~f the blending process, Turner ru·gues, happens below 'the horizon of 
consc1ous observation' (109) and it draws on such e ntrenched and to most f •· · 
"bJ • > ' 0 US IDVIS-
'. e: patter.ns that bias is extremely difficult even to detect. Blending is part of an almost 
lDStillctual backstage cognition,' as Turner and Fauconnier call it, the efficiency of which 
cannot afford to wait for slow conscious thinking. The ability to blend, Turner and Fau-
connier have argued elsewhere, is what makes us human and what has given us the 
irrunensely complex modern world we have and distinctly human things like language, 
religiun, refined tool use, a1t and philosophy. lf the mental work that underlies these mag-
nificent phenomena had been conscious mental work, if we could only blend at a con-
scious level, we would probably still be living in caves. It would be like having to be con-
scious of your every heart beat, your every breath, every step you take when you walk, and 
so on. Living would be impossible. 
Just as we are not aware of the genes and the evolutionary development that constitute us, 
we are mostly unaware of the evolution of meaning of which we are the ultimate source. 
And this takes us back to the beginning of thi s review. To understand human meaning, and 
this is Turner's high-level argument, one must understand how it comes about and the prin-
ciples of its evolution, its descent. We must have a theory that is to human meaning what 
the theory of evolution is to biology. Human beings do not just pick up and accumulate 
meaning; they develop new meanings on the basis of 'existing' meanings, while pre-
serving (or sometimes discarding) the 'existing' meanings. And the emergent meanings 
may serve as inputs for further emergent or altered meanings. Socia l scientists have tended 
to be content wi th observing beautiful butte1flies, so to speak; they have not inquired into 
the maker of these creatures. But in order to reach a deeper understanding of what consti-
tutes the phenomena they are studying and to reach a deeper understanding of what deter-
mines even the nature of their own approach, they have to take the concept of human 
meaning much more seriously. This is an extremely cha llenging task, but a whole new 
generation of cognitive science is ready to suffer w ith them. 
Anders Hougaard University of Southern Denmark, Odense 
Orm 0verland, ed. Not English Only: Redefining "American" in American Studies. Euro-
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As the editor of Not Engli sh Only slates in his ' Introduction: Redefining 'American' in 
American Studies,' ' in their different ways, the m ajority [of the articles collected in the 
present volume] explore how ideological and cultural traits recognized as 'American' have 
found expression in a variety of languages' (8). Indeed, the presen t volume starts from the 
paradox that though multiculturalism since rough ly the late 1980s has been the new ortho-
doxy in American Studies, this has not led its practitioners seriously to question, let alone 
qualify, the monolingualism - 'English only' - that has characterized the discipline if not 
from its inception (0verland insists that early histories of American Literature, such as the 
